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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN,
Plaintiff - Respondent,

vs.
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND
ASSOCIATES, a Utah
corporation,

Case No.
11579

Defendant - Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries resulting from a
partial sloughing-off of a sidewall of an excavation at the
construction site of the Public Safety and Jail Building
(now called the Metropolitan Hall of Justice) in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before Judge Stewart M. Hanson,
sitting without a jury. The court granted judgment in
favor of the plaintiff Arthur 0. Nauman and against the
defendant Harold K. Beecher and Associat.es, and awarded
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damages in the amount of $638,135.99 plus interest and
costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment
in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following statement of facts are viewed as they
must be on appeal, favorable to the finding of the court. It
also contains undisputed facts which favor the defendant.
Defendant entered into an agreement with Salt Lake
City Corporation on March 1, 1960, by which it agreed to
perform architectural services for a Public Safety and Jail
Building to be erected by Salt Lake City Corporation and
Salt Lake County (Ex. P-1) ( R-530) .
Pertinent portions of that agreement provided as
follows:
"l. THE ARCHITECT'S SERVICES. The Architect's professional services consist of the necessary conferences, the preparation of schematic and preliminary
studies, working drawings, specifications, large scale
and full size detail drawings for architectural, structural, plumbing, heating, electrical, and other mechanical work;* * * "

"7. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION. The Architect shall furnish at his expense a qualified on-site
inspector, acceptable to both Owner and Architect,
during the entire time the construction work is in progress, whose duties shall consist of checking all shop
drawings, for approval of the City Engineer, to deter-
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mine the quality and acceptance of the material and/or
equipment prop08ed to be used in the facilities being
constructed; to supervise and inspect all phases of the
work being done. (Emphasis Added)
"13. SUPERVISION. The City Engineer will
represent the Owner, Salt Lake City Corporation, with
respect to this agreement, and the Architect shall per-

t orm and conduct all required services under h'is direc-

tion and supervision and shall submit his reports of
study, drawings, design, details, specifications and
recommendations to him for City approval, as well as
all shop drawings, change orders, estimates for payment to Contractor, as required. (Emphasis Added)
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement dated March
1, 1960, defendant prepared Specifications (Ex. P-2). The
Specifications contained the general contract between Salt
Lake City, Salt Lake County and Christiansen Brothers,
Inc. the general contractor. The defendant was not a party

to that contract.
Pertinent portions of that contract provided as follows:
"12a. If, in the judgment of the Architect and/or
the City Engineer or County Engineer, it is necessary
to close down the work due to inclement weather or due
to other circumstances arising during the progress of
the work, that may be construed to be dangerous OT that
may be caused by non-compliance with the specifications, the Contractor shall comply and he shall stop all
operations upon written notice from the Architect and/
OT City Engineer or County Engineer so to do, and the
work shall remain closed down until further orders
in writing are given by said Architect and/OT City
Engineer or County Engineer to the Contractor to proceed with the work of th'is project, and there shall be
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no claim against either Salt Lake City Corporation or
Salt Lake County, or the Architect or Engineers, for
such action." (Emphasis Added)
"19. In all operations in connection with the work
embraced in this contract, the Contractor will be held
responsible for any failure to respect, adhere to and
comply with all local ordinances and laws controlling
or limiting in any way the actions of those engaged
upon the work, or affecting the materials or the transportation disposition of them. He shall also comply with
all Federal and State laws that in any manner affect
his operations under this contract. * * *" (Emphasis
Added)
The "special conditions" of the Specifications contained
the following pertinent provisions :
"lb. The Contractor shall take all necessary precautions for the safety of the public and employees on
the work and shall comply with all applicable provisions
of Federal, State and Municipal Safety Laws and Building Codes to prevent accidents or injury to persons on,
about, or adjacent to the premises where the work is
being performed. He shall erect and properly maintain
at all times, as required by the conditions and progress
of the work, all necessary safeguards for the protection
of the public and workmen and shall post danger signs
warning against hazardous conditions." (Emphasis
Added)

"l 7a. Shoring: Contractor shall provide and be
responsible for all temporary shoring required for
executing and protecting the work." (Emphasis Added)
The Metropolitan Hall of Justice complex covered approximately 11 acres of construction work (R-961). (See
Defendant's exhibits D-41, D-42, D-43, D-44, and D-45 show-
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ing construction work). Included in the construction of the
complex was an east-west utility tunnel. The tunnel extends
from the Hall of Justice Building complex across Second
East to the old City and County Building. The tunnel is
approximately 900 feet long and is used to furnish heat
from the new boiler room to the old building (R-771). The
defendant drew plans and specifications for the construction
of the utility tunnel (R-523). The plans did show the size
of the tunnel, the materials, and the elevations of the
tunnel in relationship to the exterior grades (R-952). The
p'lans did not show in any way how the excavation for the
tunnel was to be constructed (R-952). The methods and
means of construction are strictly the responsibility of the
general contractor (R-773). The general contractor commenced excavation for the utility tunnel across Second East
westward toward the City and County Building during the
latter part of July or first part of August, 1963 (R-773).
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement dated March
l, 1960, between defendant and Salt Lake City, Jonathan H.
Tucker was employed by defendant as an on-site inspector
for the entire 11 acre project (R-523). Harry But.cher
was the Project Engineer representing the City and the
County on the construction project (R-954). The defendant
and its inspector reported to the City Engineer and made no
changes or revisions without their direct approval (R-954).
Tucker noticed certain problems during the construe..
tion of the utility tunnel across Second East (R-964). He
reported to defendant that the shoring was not proper and
that the men were not observing safety regulations such
as safety hats (R-964). The defendant told Tucker to call
the State Industrial Commission and report the matter to
them (R-964). As a result of the call to the Industrial
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Commission, John Holmes, Safety Inspector for the Industrial Commission, came to the construction site on September
16, 1963, to inspect the excavation for the utility tunnel
(R-612). Holmes observed the walls of the excavation were
unsupported, the walk over the trench was unguarded, and
men were working at the bottom without hard hats (R-612).
These conditions were observed in the proximity of the
west sidewalk along Second East (R-613). Holmes talked
to the foremen for Christiansen Brothers Construction
Company and Culp Construction Company (Culp constructed a portion of the utility tunnel on the east side of
Second East) and ordered them to begin shoring the
ground and "live up to state regulations" (R-613). Holmes
saw some shoring started, but it was not completed (R-614).
On September 17, 1963, Holmes reinspected the same
working area and found his orders were being followed by
the construction companies (R-616) (Ex. D-24).
On September 18, 1963, Holmes inspected the project
again and found a sub-contractor pouring hot tar in the
excavation (R-617). Holmes stopped the work to make
the men conform to the safety orders (R-618). Regarding
his inspection trip on September 18, 1963, Holmes stated
in his memorandum:

"Other phases of the project at this time appeared
to be carried out in a safe manner." (Ex. D-24).
(Emphasis Added)
On this inspection, Holmes observed the men doing some
work on the shoring on the east side of the walk (R-618).
That shoring appeared to be proper as he observed it (R618).
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"Q. (Nebeker) And that shoring appeared to be
proper as you observed it?

A. (Holmes) Yes. They had 2 x 12 uprights and
4 x 6 crosspieces at the time, which I thought was
ample."

The shoring in the excavation near the area where the
slough-off occurred is the same shoring approved by Holmes
on Sept. 18th.
On Sept.ember 18, 1963, Commissioner Casper A. Nelson
of the Industrial Commission sent a Jett.er to Christiansen
Bros. Inc. (Ex. P-23) stating that Holmes had inspected
the project on Sept.ember 16, 1963, and submitted the following recommendations :
"l. Proper sloping or shoring must be maintained
in all trench work, and ladders must be provided as
escapeways.

2. All elevated walkways must be guarded to conform with Stat.e safety rules.
3. All employees doing work in trenches must
wear protective headgear.
Holmes visited the project for the fourth time on October 4, 1963 (R-619). Holmes' memorandum (Ex. D-24)
contains the following entry:
"On Oct. 4, 1963, I visit.ed the project and ordered
Culp Construction Company to install guardrailing in
open sections of the library building. The trench in

the Christiansen Construction area was being filled
at this time. No w<>rk was being performed in the
west end of the trench." (Emphasis Added)
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Sometime in the latter part of September, Beecher had
a conversation with Wally Christiansen (vice president of
Christiansen Brothers and Project Manager of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice) to discuss the foreman who was in
charge of the utility tunnel phase of the project (R-967).
Due to the apparent inexperience of the foreman and
the fact that good construction practices were not being
observed, Beecher told Christiansen, "We have got to get
a new foreman for this work." (Tr.-447). At that time, the
utility tunnel was partially shored and excavated as shown
in Exhibit P-3 & P-4 and Exhibit D-32 & D-33 (enlargements of P-3 and P-4).
Christiansen agreed to stop the work on the utility
tunnel until he could obtain a competent safe foreman (R969) (R-787).
About two weeks later, Christiansen notified Beecher
he had located a competent safe foreman and was planning
to bring him down to take charge of the utility tunnel (R971). The plaintiff, Arthur 0. Nauman, was the foreman
selected by Christiansen to take charge of the tunnel and
excavation (R-971).
During the two week period while the work in the
excavation was stopped, Christiansen Brothers back-filled
the excavation to a point approximately 100 feet west of
Second East (R-789).
On October 10, 1963, the daily reports show there was
equipment working to load the dirt on the side of the excavation in trucks so it could be hauled away (R-791). Once the
dirt was removed, Evan Ashby, the operator of the drag
line, began cleaning out the excavation and sloping the
banks so when Nauman came on the job they could start
work on the tunnel again (R-791).
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Nauman first came on the job October 16, 1963 (R651).
Christiansen told Nauman there was a light pole on
the side of the excavation which the city would not allow to
be removed (R-654). Christiansen further said they could
not "taper" any more in that are.a, and Nauman would have
to rely on the shoring in that area or additional shoring if
he needed it (R-654).
Nauman and Christiansen went into the tunnel to
examine the material there and Nauman was instructed as
to what the materials were and how to use them (R-657).
Ashby, the drag line operator, was told to take directions
from Nauman (R-685). Nauman was authorized to put
in whatever shoring he felt was appropriate (R-687).
Nauman testified as he understood the conditions, he
considered it safe for the work they were doing (R-690).
"Q. (Barker) Did you consider the conditions as
they then existed to be safe for what you were doing?

A. (Nauman) As I understood the conditions at
the time, I considered it safe for the work we were
doing in regards to leveling the gravel, pumping the
water, taking the higher portions of soil out of the
excavation with the gravel fill." (R-690). (Emphasis
Added)
Nau man further testified he looked at the walls of the
excavation for safety purposes and considered them safe
for the type of work they were doing (R-696).
"Q. (Barker) Did you look the walls over for
safety purposes on the 16th and 17th, the walls of the
excavation?

A. (Nauman) Briefly, to my satisfaction, yes.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
Q. (Barker) And did you consider those walls in
such manner that it was safe to send workmen into
the excavation?

A. (Nauman) Yes, for the type of work we were
doing."
On the morning of October 17, 1963, Nauman went into
the excavation with a surveyor's level to make some grade
shots for the laborers who were doing some fine grading
in the bottom of the excavation (R-663). Nauman was
standing about eight feet from the end of the existing tunnel
on a slab of concrete which extended from the floor of the
existing tunnel when the slough-off occurred (R-664). The
slough-off occurred in the transition area between the shoring and the sloping (Ex. P-13).
The dirt which sloughed off from the south side of the
excavation hit a plywood panel which extended from the
end of the south side of the completed tunnel (P-13). The
force of dirt knocked the panel against Nauman and he
was knocked down ( R-664) . Jonathan Tucker thought
Nauman was knocked over into the "rebars" (reinforcing
steel rods) on the north side of the utility tunnel and hit
his head on one of the rebars (second Tucker deposition
taken in Oakland, California on October 8, 1968, p. 64).
At the trial before Judge Hanson, defendant called
three architects besides Beecher, who testified that the
excavation appeared safe.
Joe Ruben, a licensed architect since 1963, was an
employee of defendant at the time of the accident. He testified that he took the photographs P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6, and P-7
(R-198). The photographs dated October 2, 1963, and October 16, 1963, were enlarged and photographic projections
were made on the enlargements. Ruben testified that where
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there is a known distance in a photograph, other distances
in the same plane can be determined ( R-721) . In the enlarged
photograph dated October 16, 1963, (D-31) the known
dimension is the width of the tunnel-8 feet 8 inches (R732). By means of the photographic projection, Ruben
determined that the depth of the excavation was 21' 11";
that the width of the excavation at the bottom was 15' and
the width at the top was 37' (R-722). He further testified
that the south bank of the excavation had been sloped out
a distance of 11' (R-723). This sloping met the full requirements of the Industrial Commission : one foot of slope
for every two feet of depth. Here, the excavation was about
22 feet deep and the walls had been sloped back eleven
feet on both sides of the excavation (R-725).
Ruben testified that photographic projections are
accurate and represent a true and faithful representation
of what actually existed (R-726).

Ruben further testified he considered the excavation
safe to go into on October 16, 1963-the day he took the
photograph. (R-751).
Fred Montmorency, a licensed architect since 1960,
testified that the "American Institute of Architects Handbook of Professional Practice," September, 1963 Edition,
states that the architect is responsible for seeing that the
contract is properly performed and guards the owner
against defects and deficiencies in the work (R-834).
Montmorency further stated that under American
Institute of Architect's Document A201, the contractor was
to take all necessary precautions for the safety of employees
on the work (R-837).
Montmorency further testified that he had examined
all of the documents and photographs relating to the
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excavation and in his opinion Beecher acted in a reasonable
and prudent manner with respect to the safety of this
particular phase of the project (R-825). He said the excavation appeared safe (R-844).
Ralph Edwards, a licensed architect since 1954, testified that he had also reviewed all documents and photographs relating to the excavation (R-904). He testified
that in his opinion the excavation appeared safe and he
would not have stopped the work (R-911). He further
stated that if a representative from the Industrial Commission had come down and inspected the job and did not
issue an order stating that the job should be closed down,
then he would assume the job was to continue (R-916).
Beecher, a licensed architect since 1940 testified that in
his opinion the excavation appeared safe on October 17,
1963, and he would not have shut it down (R-986).
The plaintiff did not offer in evidence any testimony
from an architect that in his opinion the excavation was
dangerous at the time of the accident and the work should
have been stopped. This is true even though the plaintiff's
attorneys had an architect in the courtroom during a substantial part of the trial ( R-1109) .
On the basis of thls evidence, the court sitting without
a jury entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant and awarded damages in the amount
of $638,135.99.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case defendant
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moved the court for an involuntary dismissal under Rule
41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R-712). At the
conclusion of all the evidence, defendant renewed its motion
(R-1062). Defendant contends the plaintiff failed to produce
any competent evidence from which the finder of fact
could conclude that the defendant was negligent and that
defendant was entitled to a direcled verdict.
The courts and text writers have unanimously held
that the duty of an architect is the same as the duty owing
by a lawyer or doctor.
"An architect, in contracting for his services as
such, implies that he possesses skill and ability, including taste, sufficient to enable him to perform the
required services at least ordinarily and reasonably
well, and that he will exercise and apply in the given
case his skill, ability, judgment and taste reasonably
and without neglect. The duty owing to his employer
is essentially the same as that which is owed by any
person to another where such person holds himself
out as possessing skill and ability in some special
employment and offers his services to the public on
account of his fitness to act in the line of business for
which he may be employed. An architect holds himself out as an expert in his particular line of work and
is employed because he is believed to be such." 5 Am Jur
2d Architects § 9 pp 670-671.
In Bayne v. Everham, 163 N.W. 1002, 1008 (Mich.
1917), the Court held:
" ... [T]he responsibility of an architect does not
differ from that of a lawyer or physician. When he
possesses the requisite skill and knowledge, and in the
exercise thereof has used his best judgment, he has
done all the law requires. The architect is not a warrantor of his plans and specifications. The result may show
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a mistake or defect, although he may have exercised the
reasonable skill required."
In Paxton v. Alameda County, 259 P.2d 934 (Cal. App.
1953), a workman fell through the roof of a building when
the sheathing gave way. He sued the architect and alleged
negligence in the preparation of the plans and specifications
for the building. The appellate court approved the following
instruction which clearly and correctly states the prevailing law as to the standard of care owed to third parties
by an architect :
"By undertaking professional service to a client, an
architect impliedly represents that he possesses, and
it is his duty to possess, that degree of learning and
skill ordinarily possessed by architects of good standing, practicing in the same locality. It is his further
duty to use the care ordinarily exercised in like cases
by reputable members of his profession practicing in
the same locality; to use reasonable diligence and his
best judgment in the exercise of his skill and the application of his learning, in an effort to accomplish the
purpose for which he is employed. . . In determining
whether the defendants architects' learning, skill and
conduct fulfilled the duties imposed by law, as they
have been stated to you, you are not permitted to set
up arbitrarily a standard of your own. The standard
is that set by the learning, skill and care ordinarily
possessed and practiced by others of the same profession in the same locality, at the same time." (Emphasis Added)
Ordinarily, expert opinion is necessary to establish
the standard of care practiced by professional men and
whether or not there has been a breach of that standard.
In Covil v. Robert & Co. Assoc., 144 S.E.2d 450 (Ga.
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App. 1965), a Georgia court compared the architect with
other professional men and held that the care required of an
architect is properly the subject of expert opinion:
"By analogy with other cases in which recovery has
been sought against persons for their negligence in
performing skilled services, it was necessary here that
plaintiffs establish the standard of care applicable to
defendant by the introduction of expert opinion evidence. (citations omitted) If this standard was not
established by the necessary proof, the trial court was
justified in the grant of nonsuit."
In Paxton v. Alameda County, supra, the court considered the question of expert testimony and held there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that the architect
was negligent in the preparation of plans and specifications.
Three experts, in addition to the defendant, testified the
plans and specifications were prepared according to the
accepted standard and practice in Alameda County. The
plaintiff produced one architect (Rosebrook) who testified
to the contrary. He testified that the specifications used
did not conform to the customary practice in the community.
The Appellate Court concluded that Rosebrook's testimony
was too insubstantial and incomplete to support a finding of
negligence. The court noted:

"That opinion (of Rosebrook) would seem to have
no greater weight than if made by a carpenter untrained and inexperienced in computing loads and
stresses and the relative tensile strength of various
types and grades of lumber." Id. at 942.
And further:
"Mere deviation from 'customary practice' does
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not, under the circumstances of our case, prove that
the resulting condition was dangerous or defective." Id.
The Appellate Court, commenting on the testimony of
the experts, stated:
"Thus we have a picture of an architect who carefully computed the loads the sheathing would be called
upon to bear and the strength and allowable stress of
various materials. He then specified a material which
those computations convince him had a wide margin of
safety between the stresses it would receive and those
it was capable of bearing. These computations he made
in compliance with the applicable requirements of the
building laws and in accordance with the standards of
good practice in his profession and his community.
That, we think, would negative a basis for a finding of
negligence even if he had made some mistakes in his
computations and there is no evidence that he made any
such mistakes, instead, the experts who did compute
confirmed his method of computing and the results of
his computations." (Emphasis Added)
In 55 California Law Review appears an article entitled
"Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of Plans and
Specifications." The author of the article states:
"A jury can judge the skill of an architect in
analyzing stresses only by hearing testimony from
other architects; it can learn about standard architectural practices only by hearing architects testify as to
those practices. As in other fields of professional
liability, however, if a layman is as competent as an
expert to judge whether or not a particular design
created an unusual risk, evidence by experts is inadmissible because their proof that the defendant followed
standard practice would not necessarily show he was
not negligent." 55 Cal. L.R. 1361, 1364 (1967)
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In medical malpractice cases, this court has consistently
followed the general rule that expert opinion is necessary to
show that the physician did not exercise reasonable care,
skill and diligence usually exercised by physicians practicing
in the community.
The cast; of Coon v. Shields, 88 Utah 76, 39 P.2d 348
(1934), involved an action for damages against a surgeon
arising out of alleged negligence in the treatment of a leg injury. The plaintiff alleged that the doctor did not use proper
medical practices and as a consequence, plaintiff's leg had
to be amputated to save her life. The lower court directed
a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff offered expert
testimony, in the form of a treatise, that the defendant had
used a "worthless" antiseptic. In rejecting that evidence,
the Court stated :
"In a case such as this confusion often arises over
a failure to distinguish between the expert's opinion as
to the proper method of treatment and his opinion as
to whether or not the treatment applied conforms to
what is generally accepted to be the proper method. The
practice of medicine or of surgery has not become so
standardized that it is unreasonable for two doctors to
have different opinions as to the proper method of
treating injuries. If, then, there is reason for the
existence of that difference, neither opinion can be
proven erroneous by offering as proof thereof merely
the other. It does not fall upon the shoulders of the
judge or jury to determine whether or not there is a
good and sufficient reason for the existence of such a
difference; that reason is assumed to be valid when it
appears from the evidence that the divisions of opinion
are such that it cannot be said of any one opinion that
it is generally accepted to be the right one." Coon at
349. (Emphasis Added)
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In Dickinson v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 383, 423 P.2d 663
(1967), there was a question as to whether a physician had
properly treated a child's finger which later had to be
amputated. The court held that a doctor was not required
to guarantee his treatment:

"It will be noted that the only expert testimony in
the case comes from Doctor Wilson, the plaintiffs'
family physician. Doctor Wilson was of the opinion
that there was a possibility that the finger might have
been saved with treatment other than that employed
by the defendant, however, he also testified that in all
probability the finger would have required amputation
because the bone in the finger had already been amputa.ted. Had the court submitted the matter to the jury on
the case as made by the plaintiffs it would have required the jury to speculate and to base its verdict upon
conjecture. The law does not impose upon a physician
or surgeon the duty of guaranteeing that his treatment
will achieve good results, but on the contrary, the law
imposes upon him the duty to employ that care and
skill required of men of similar calling, and under
similar circumstances." Dickinson at 665. (Emphasis
Added)
Was the condition of this excavation so obviously
dangerous that an untrained layman could recognize it?
It is respectfully submitted that the answer to this question
is "no" because untrained laymen working on the job
thought it was safe. The plaintiff testified he thought the
excavation was safe for the work they were doing (R-692).
Ashby, the operator of the drag line, testified the excavation
was safe for the work that was being performed (R-891).
Wally Christiansen, the project manager for the general
contractor, testified the excavation was "safe" (R-803). In
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addition to the lay testimony that the excavation appeared
safe, the defendant called four architects, including the
defendant's president who testified the excavation appeared
safe. Ruben, a licensed architect, testified that the south
bank of the excavation (the bank where the slough-off occurred) had been sloped back 11 feet. He testified that
since the excavation was about 22 feet deep, the slope was
in full compliance with the requirements of the State Industrial Commisson (R-723). He further testified on
cross-examination that he felt the excavation was safe (R751). Montmorency, licensed architect, testified that in his
opinion the excavation did not constitute a dangerous condition (R-831). He also testified the excavation was safe
(R-844). Edwards, licensed architect, testified the slope of
the excavation met the requirements of the State Industrial
Commission (R-914). He testified that the excavation was
in "good condition" from his visual observation of the photographs which were taken the day before the accident (R910). Beecher, president of the defendant architectural
firm, testified that in looking at the excavation it appeared
to be safe and he would not have shut down the work (R986). No one thought the excavation was unsafe.

This testimony conclusively shows that the condition
of the excavation was not so obviously dangerous that a layman could easily recognize the hazard. This was a matter
for expert testimony from an architect. This is particularly
true when viewed in the light of the contract between the
Joint Authority and the general contractor. That contract
specifically provided: "If in the judgment of the architect . .. " No fact finder could conclude that the architect
had exercised unreasonable judgment except upon the testimony of other architects. The plaintiff failed to call any
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architects as witnesses. This is true even though plaintiff
had an architect in the courtroom during a substantial portion of the trial (R-1109).
Since the plaintiff failed to call an architect to testify
that in his opinion the defendant had failed to exercise that
degree of care ordinarily exercised by architects in the
community, there was no competent evidence to submit to
the fact finder. Defendant's motion for an involuntary
dismissal should have been granted at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's case or at the conclusion of all the evidence.
It is assumed that plaintiff will argue that the testimony of Harry F. Butcher, Project Engineer for Salt Lake
City, John Holmes, Safety Inspector for the Industrial Commission and Casper A. Nelson, former member of the Industrial Commission, presented enough evidence to justify
submitting the matter to the fact finder. None of these
witnesses were architects. Butcher is a land surveyor,
Holmes has no professional qualification and Nelson is a
chemical engineer. None of these witnesses testified that
in their opinion the defendant architect had failed to exercise reasonable care.
Holmes did not testify to the issue of whether or not
the excavation appeared safe on the morning of the accident.
Butcher testified that the walls of the excavation were
straight up and down except where it had been sloped a
little at the top (R-563).
Butcher admitted on cross-examination that the south
bank had been sloped back 10 feet (R-591). This amount
of slope would be in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Industrial Commission.
Nelson testified the walls of the excavation were "real
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vertical-rather irregular as one might expect with a drag
line excavation..." (R-630).
Nelson also admitted on cross-examination that the
walls had been sloped back ten or eleven feet on both sides
(R-639), which would be in full compliance with the requirements of the Industrial Commission.
This Court has previously held that the testimony of a
witness on his direct examination is no stronger than as
modified or left by cross-examination. In Alvarado v.
Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954), this Court
stated:
" ... The rule is familiar that 'testimony of a witness on
his direct examination is no stronger than as modified
or left by his further examination or by his crossexamination. A particular part of his testimony may
not be singled out to the exclusion of other parts of
equal importance bearing on the subject."
The testimony from these witnesses clearly shows the
excavation had been sloped properly and met the requirements of the Industrial Commission. Their descriptions
of the excavation constitute nothing more than their opinions. That opinion would not constitute competent evidence
on which to find the defendant negligent. See Coon v.
Shields, supra.
It is respectfully submitted that defendant was entitled
to an involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case.
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POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY
NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
The plaintiff failed to produce competent expert testimony to show the defendant was negligent. If the
excavation was so dangerous that a layman could testify
as to his observations, then the plaintiff, a construction
foreman, is guilty of negligence as a matter of law for
going in the excavation and permitting workmen under
his direction to go in when he knew or should have known
the excavation was dangerous.
The undisputed testimony shows the plaintiff thought
the excavation was safe. Nauman examined the walls of the
excavation on October 16th and 17th when he was in the
excavation to see if they were safe (R-696). He testified he
considered the walls safe for the type of work they were
doing (R-696). In spite of the plaintiff's uncontradicted
testimony that the excavation was safe, plaintiff claims
the excavation was dangerous, and the defendant should
have stopped the work. The plaintiff is caught on the
horns of a dilemma. If the excavation appeared safe as he
testified, then the defendant was not negligent in reaching
the same conclusion. However, if the excavation was
dangerous, it was more apparent to the plaintiff that! it
was to the defendant and the plaintiff was negligent. The
plaintiff was the foreman on this phase of the work. He had
the timber to shore and the drag line and operator to
slope. He had the authority to do anything he felt was
necessary to make the excavation safe (R-685-687). Nauman had been in the construction work approximately 17
years (R-670). He stated every job has some amount of
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excavation (R-668). The deepest excavation he could
recall was the excavation on the east side of the University
Medical Center which was approximately 18 feet deep
(R-668). The plaintiff cannot claim in one breath that
the excavation appeared safe to him and in the next breath
that it should have appeared dangerous to the defendant.
The plaintiff had the primary responsibility to protect his
own life. If the excavation was dangerous and a layman
could so testify, the plaintiff should have observed that
condition and refused to go in the excavation or corrected
the situation.
This court has previously recognized the rule that if
reasonable minds would not be warranted in reaching any
conclusion other than that plaintiff is guilty of contributory
negligence in the light of his own testimony or other
undisputed facts, there is no jury question but a question
of law for the court.
In Frank v. McCarthy, 112 Utah 422, 118 P.2d 737
(1948) , a motor vehicle train collision case, plaintiffs
obtained a jury verdict against defendant. At trial, defendants moved for a directed verdict claiming plaintiffs
were contributorily negligent for crossing the tracks while
their view was obstructed. The lower court denied defendants' motion.

On appeal, this court reversed, holding that plaintiffs'
contributory negligence barred their recovery. This court
held:
" ... if reasonable minds would not be warranted
in reaching any conclusion other than that plaintiffs
were guilty of contributory negligence in the light
of plaintiffs' own testimony or other undisputed
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facts, there is no jury question but a question of law
for the court." Id. at 426.
In Benson v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P.2d 790 (1955), plaintiff motorist
sued defendant for injuries sustained in a train auto
collision. A jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal, defendants claimed plaintiff was contributorily negligent as
a matter of law because he failed to maintain a proper
lookout.
This court reversed the jury verdict stating:
"The rule to be applied in deciding whether or
not plaintiff is to be held contributorily negligent as
a matter of law is . . . If all reasonable minds would
arrive at the same conclusion, that is, that Benson
failed to use the degree of care which an ordinary,
reasonable and prudent person would have observed
for his own safety under the circumstances, then the
defendant's contention [of contributory negligence as
a matter of law] is correct." Id. at 41.
Defendant denies that its acts or omissions in any way
contributed to the accident on October 17, 1963. However,
plaintiff claims that the excavation was dangerous. If this
contention is correct and the defendant should have observed the condition and stopped the work, then it must
follow that the dangerous condition was obvious to the
plaintiff. Plaintiff knew that this portion of the work had
been shut down because the previous foreman had not
competently and safely directed the work and plaintiff was
specifically directed to be careful and safe. (R-676-680)
The plaintiff had the duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect his own life. His failure to take reasonable pre-
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cautions for his own safety would constitute negligence
as a matter of law.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
IS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Plaintiff, an employee of Christiansen Brothers, Inc.,
is receiving his workmen's compensation benefits. He has
filed suit against defendant alleging defendant is liable
as a third party pursuant to the provisions of Section 351-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides:
"Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of
third parties-Remedies of employee-Rights of
employer or insurance carrier in cause of actionMaintenance of action-Disbursement of proceeds of
recovery.- When any injury or death for which
compensation is payable under this title shall have
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another
person not in the same employment, the injured employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim
compensation and the injured employee or his heirs
or personal representative may also have an action for
damages against such third person . . ." (Emphasis
Added)
Defendant contends that plaintiff's action is barred as
a matter of law under the provisions of Section 35-1-62,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, because plaintiff and defendant
were in the same employment.
The contract between the defendant and Salt Lake
City Corporation required the defendant "to supervise and
inspect all phases of the work being done." (Ex. P-8)
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The contract entered into between the Joint Authority
and Christiansen Brothers, Inc., the general contractor,
provided that if in the judgment of the architect it was
necessary to close down the work due to "other circumstances arising during the progress of the work, that may
be construed to be dangerous," then the contractor was to
comply and stop all operations upon written notice of the
architect.
If this right and corresponding duty did exist, which
defendant denies, defendant clearly had the right to supervise and control the plaintiff. The right to supervise and
control is the basic element in determining when there is
an employment situation. Section 35-1-42, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, expressly states that where an employer retains
supervision and control over a contractor, that contractor
and all persons employed by him and all subcontractors
under him are considered in the same employment. Where
the employees of one contractor had the right to supervise
and direct the employees of another, this court has held
that a suit by an injured employee of one contractor against
the other contractor, working on the same project, was
barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act.
In Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d 20, 386
P.2d 616 (1963), the plaintiff sued the defendant for
injuries suffered while working on a diversion tunnel at
the Flaming Gorge Dam.
The plaintiff was employed by Coker Construction Co.
Kiewit had a contract with Coker to construct the tunnel
and to share profits and losses in the enterprise. The plaintiff's job was to drill holes in the rock in which charges
of dynamite were placed. The plaintiff testified in his
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deposition that he was directed where to drill by Kiewit
engineers. The plaintiff contended that one of Kiewit's
employees had negligently placed a charge of dynamite
in such a position that Kiewit should have foreseen that
plaintiff would strike it when drilling holes within the
scope of his employment with Coker.
The defendant moved for summary judgment based
upon the affidavits, depositions and pleadings in the case.
The defendant contended that the plaintiff was in its employ
and that the plaintiff was barred by the exclusive remedy
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The defendant appealed the denial of its motion for summary
judgment.
This court held that the employees of Coker were
employees of the defendant, Peter Kiewit & Sons, and that
the defendant was entitled to summary judgment.
In interpreting the language of Section 35-1-62, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, supra, this court stated:
"The language of the statute preserving an action
against ' . . . third persons' who are 'not in the same
employment ... ' seems plainly designed to apply to
strangers to the employment and not to co-workers
jointly engaged in the same endeavor."
This court further stated :
"In approaching the question here presented it
is well to keep in mind that the philosophy behind the
Workmen's Compensation Act encompasses two main
objectives. The first is to assure that an employee who
is injured in employment will have necessary medical
and hospital care and modest but certain compensation
for his injury, with resulting benefits to himself, his
family and to society generally; the other is to afford
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employers a measure of protection against exorbitant
claims for injuries.
In regard to the protection of employees, if circumstances were such that it was necessary to classify
the plaintiff as an employee of defendant Kiewit
Construction Company to qualify for workmen's
compensation, undoubtedly there would have been efforts to so classify him. This is not without justification.
This court has frequently stated that the Act should
be liberally construed and applied to afford coverage
to the employee and give effect to the purposes of the
act. This rule of liberality in finding coverage for the
employee is sound and is applicable here, even though
the plaintiff, having already obtained his award, now
attempts to go contrary to this policy and 'paddle for
the other shore' in contending that he would not be
covered by workmen's compensation as an employee
of Kiewit." (Emphasis Added)
Although this court held the defendant and plaintiff's
employer were joint venturers, that was not the sole basis
for the holding. The dissenting opinion noted that the
majority opinion placed little reliance on the technical
requisites of a joint venture.
The real basis of the decision was that there was an
overlap of supervision by the defendant and the plaintiff's
employer. The court noted:
"The plaintiff testified that he worked with them
fairly closely and that he was directed where to drill
by Kiewit engineers."
Thus, the decision rested on the fact that the defendant
and the plaintiff's employer were both engaged in the same
endeavor and exercised supervisory functions over each
other's employees. The test is whether or not the employers
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are engaged in the same project and whether there is an
overlap of supervision.
In Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 274
Pac. 940 (1929) this court held the Workmen's Compensation
Act barred a third party suit against the defendant contractor where the injured man, an employee of Denver & Rio
Grande Railroad Co., was engaged in work for which the
defendant was responsible.

The defendant had entered into a contract with the
State of Utah for the construction of a highway parallel
to a Denver & Rio Grande Railroad track. The plaintiff
Murray was an employee of the railroad company.
Murray was designated by a railroad official to keep the
track clear of debris, to warn the defendant of oncoming
trains and the trainmen of possible obstruction on the
tracks.
The plaintiff was paid his salary by the railroad company but the railroad was reimbursed by the defendant for
the plaintiff's services.
Plaintiff was injured by the alleged negligence of
defendant's employees. This court held plaintiff was an
employee of the defendant and workmen's compensation
was his exclusive remedy, even though the defendant did not
list plaintiff as an employee with the State Industrial
Commission.
This court said that regardless of the manner of the
plaintiff's selection or who paid his wages or had power to
discharge him or the possibility that the railroad company
might remain his general employer, he was an employee of
the defendant while engaged in work for which the defendant was responsible.
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This court held :

"We are of the opinion that under the facts in
this case the relation of employee and employer as
defined by the Workmen's Compensation Act existed as
a matter of law between the plaintiff and defendant.
In such case the exclusive remedy of the plaintiff is
to proceed under such act ... " (Emphasis Added)
If the defendant Beecher had the duty to supervise and
inspect the work, it shared the responsibility for the work
being performed by the plaintiff. Beecher's duty to supervise and inspect and to bear responsibility for compliance
with the drawings and specifications places Beecher and
Nauman "in the same employment."
In Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442 P.2d
31 (1968), this court held that the plaintiff and defendant
were working for the same employer at the time when the
defendant injured the plaintiff so plaintiff's action was
barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
In that case the defendant owned a dump truck and
orally agreed to furnish it, including a driver to Gibbons
and Reed Company at a price of ten dollars per hour while
in use. Gibbons and Reed did not list the defendant, the
actual driver of the truck, on their payroll and made no
deductions from the truck rental, for social security, income
taxes, and dues. Gibbons and Reed had a contract to
lower the grade of a street in Ogden City. After the street
had been excavated to the new grade, the dirt was loaded into
dump trucks and hauled to a destination determined by
Gibbons and Reed. The plaintiff was an employee of Gibbons and Reed Company.
The defendant had to maintain his position in a line
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of trucks which were similarly engaged in hauling dirt for
Gibbons and Reed. Defendant was told when to increase
the speed of his truck, when to back up, when to drive
away, and he could not haul dirt in any other manner than
he was told.
Defendant, while backing his truck into position,
backed over the plaintiff, causing personal injuries. This
court held the plaintiff and defendant were employees of
Gibbons and Reed and the plaintiff's exclusive remedy
was workmen's compensation.
The basis of the decision was the control of Gibbons
and Reed over the defendant which made him a co-employee
with the plaintiff.
Applying the rationale of the Utah cases to the instant
case, it appears that Beecher and Nauman were "in the
same employment." Beecher and Nauman were co-workers
jointly engaged in the same endeavor. Beecher, as the
architect, had the duty to supervise and inspect all phases
of the work being done. In the execution of this duty, it
exercised control over Nauman's work. Under Utah law, it
is immaterial that Beecher did not hire Nauman or pay
his workmen's compensation premium.
Beecher and Christiansen Brothers both had contracts
with the Joint Authority. Their relationship is similar to
that of two subcontractors working for the same principal.
In Maddox v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 259 F.2d 51
(5th Cir. 1958), a suit very similar to the instant case, the
city was engaged in expanding its facilities for furnishing
water to its inhabitants and contracted with Black and
Beatch, consulting engineers, to prepare plans for the
work and to supervise its execution. The city contracted
the Petyak-Y oung Construction Co. to perform the work.
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Plaintiffs' intestate, Maddox, was an employee of the
construction company. As the work progressed, the engineers sent an employee to inspect the work. The engineer's
employee was accompanied by the deceased to assist in the
inspection.
While in one of the water mains, the engineer's
employee negligently lit a match which caused an explosion,
killing the construction company's employee.
The trial court dismissed an action filed by the heirs
of Maddox as a matter of law on the ground that the engineers and the contractor were in the same employment and
thus the action was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The basis of the decision was a statute, similar to that
in Utah, which made the original employer liable for Workmen's Compensation coverage of the employees of any
contractor.
Similarly, the joint authority in the instant case, being
responsible for the workmen's compensation coverage
with all of its contractors under the above-quoted statute,
places Beecher and Nauman in the same employment.
Other courts have held suits of employees of one subcontractor against the other contractor were barred by the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
See Miami Roofing and Sheet Metal Co. v. Kindt, 48
So.2d 840 (Florida, 1950) (suit by employee of one contractor against another subcontractor on same project, held:
Action barred by Workmen's Compensation Act); Dresser
v. New Hampshire Structural Steel Co., 4 N.E.2d 1012
(Mass. 1936), (action by employee of one subcontractor
against another subcontractor on same project, held: Action
barred under Workman's Compensation Law; Turnage v.
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Northern Virginia Steel Corp., 336 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.,
1964) (suit by employee of subcontractor against general
contractor on same project held: Action barred by the
Workman's Compensation Law).
Some of the courts which have held the Workmen's
Compensation Act barred third party suits have done so on
the grounds the party being sued was liable for payment
of the workmen's compensation insurance premium. The
theory behind this line of cases is that the contractor includes the amount of the workmen's compensation premium
in the bid to the owner or general contractor.
Although the defendant did not pay the insurance
premiums for Nauman, this court has not required payment
of the compensation premium as a prerequisite in determining whether the contractor had tort immunity under the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
In 9 Utah L. Rev. 939, (1965) appears an excellent note
entitled "Third-Party Liability Under Workmen's Compensation Law". At page 957 the author states:
" ... Having responsibility for compensation insurance
premiums,· however, does not seem to be an indispensable factor under Utah cases in determining whether
a contractor has tort immunity. In Cook, (supra) the
defendant-employer who received immunity was not
responsible for workmen's compensation insurance on
the injured employee. In Murray (supra), an employer
was given exemption from tort liability on the basis that
an employee could have two employers, and that the
defendant had paid no compensation premiums on the
injured workman or even listed him as an employee
was inconsequential. In Burke (75 Utah 441, 286 Pac.
623 ( 1930), immunity was purchased by the principal's
paying the premiums directly under an agreement wit~
· the contractor when he had no statutory obligation to
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do so ... The Utah decisions suggest that the court
looks to the facts of each case and then makes a determination on an ad hoc basis of whether two contractors are 'in the same employment.' Furthermore, the
Utah Supreme Court recognizes the compromise
character of the act as it has been designed by the
legislature and attempts to guard the rights of employers as zealously as it guards the rights of employees ... "
As indicated in the Cook case, supra, "the language of
the statute preserving an action against' ... third persons'
who are 'not in the same employment ... ' " seems plainly
designed to apply to strangers to the employment and not
to co-workers jointly engaged in the same endeavor.
The purpose of the act is to give employees certain
compensation and to afford employers protection against
exorbitant claims for injuries. The act should also protect
subcontractors working on the same project.
This court has interpreted the language "in the same
employment" broadly to protect employees and also to
protect employers. On this basis it is respectfully submitted
that Beecher is within the scope of protection afforded by
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act and the action is
barred.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT
In paragraphs 16 and 18 of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law the court found that the "trench in
the area where the cavein occurred was dangerous and
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unsafe * * * and did not comply with the General Safety
Orders of the Utah State Industrial Commission regarding
sloping and shoring * * * " (R-464).
The court further found that the "architect knew or
should have known that the trench was unsafe * * * "
(R-464).
As a result of these findings the court concluded the
defendant was negligent for failing to stop the work
(R-465).
The evidence does not support these findings for all
the witnesses testified the excavation appeared safe or they
admitted the walls had been properly sloped. (See Point I
wherein the testimony of the various witnesses is reviewed.)
The shoring over the partially completed tunnel did not
fail (Ex. 13). Both the north and the south bank of the
excavation west of the existing tunnel had been properly
sloped (D-30, D-31, R-722, 723).
The undisputed testimony clearly establ'ished that the
defendant was not negligent. It had taken every reasonable
precaution to see that the excavation was safe. No one
thought the excavation was dangerous at the time the
slough-off occurred.
The court also made a finding that the plaintiff was
not warned of the "dangerous conditions" existing in the
trench and "was not aware of the same due to his lack
of prior experiences in such trenches" (R-463-464).
On the basis of these findings the court concluded that
the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent nor did he
assume the risk (Paragraph 13 and 15, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, R-465).
This finding and conclusion is contrary to the undisputed testimony. The evidence shows the plaintiff had been
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in the construction industry 17 years (R-676). He had been
a foreman for Christiansen Bros. for 4 years (R-668).
Plaintiff knew this portion of the work had been stopped
because the prior foreman had not competently and safely
directed the work (R-676-680). Nauman stated every job
has some amount of excavation (R-668). He had been on an
excavation about 18 feet deep (R-668). Plaintiff had been
on the job 91/2 hours and had actually examined and observed the earth banks of the excavation. He considered
the walls and the excavation safe for the work they were
doing (R-696).
If the excavation was dangerous as plaintiff claims,
then he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for
going in the excavation. (See Point II).
The court also concluded as a matter of law that the
plaintiff's complaint was not barred by the provisions of
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act (R-465). It is
respectfully submitted that this conclusion is contrary to
the law. (See Point III).
CONCLUSION
The undisputed testimony clearly shows the defendant
was not negligent. Defendant requested the Industrial
Commission inspectors to examine the excavation. By
mutual agreement between the architect and the general
contractor, the work on the excavation was stopped for
about two weeks while the general contractor located a
competent foreman to handle that phase of the project.
The plaintiff, the competent foreman chosen by Christiansen,
was given authority to do whatever he felt was necessary
to make the excavation safe. He stated that the excava-
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tion appeared safe for the work they were doing. The
plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to show that defendant's president was negligent in the judgment he
exercised. In the absence of any competent testimony to
prove negligence, the defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict, or in the alternative, to a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHENB.NEBEKER
and
RONALD C. BARKER
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant.
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